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The increased use of "emergency" supplemental appropriations is gaining
awareness within the Department of Defense (DoD) and continues to reflect the pressure
of budget caps in the congressional appropriations process. While the defense portion of
supplemental has been relatively small since the Vietnam War, emergency
supplemental for natural disasters, military contingencies, and peacekeeping have
steadily increased since the Persian Gulf War. The primary objective of this study is to
focus on the history, policies, and processes of emergency supplemental appropriations
and how they impact the DoD budget. Data were obtained by applying a legislative
history tracking methodology to over sixty emergency supplemental bills, including all
significant dates within the bill process by fiscal year from 1974 to 1999. Analysis of the
data support the conclusion that it is imperative that Congress exercise good budgetary
discipline and discretion regarding emergency supplemental appropriations. It should
require agencies to improve planning for emergencies in order to avoid creating new
budgets and mid-year plus-ups. Congress can avoid mortgaging future defense readiness
and still support the military's role in global emergency operations. Irrespective of
improvements in budget planning, some level of supplemental appropriations will always
be necessary to meet true budget emergencies.
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The primary objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of the
history, policies, and processes of emergency supplemental appropriations and how they
directly impact the national defense budget. It also provides an understanding of the
policy for emergency designations, the process of how they have been funded, and how
they relate to federal budget spending caps. In addition, it describes for the reader how
past emergencies have impacted the overall federal budget, resulting in either a positive
or negative effect on the availability of discretionary, e.g., defense funds.
The increased use of "emergency" supplemental appropriations is gaining
increased awareness within the Department of Defense (DoD) and continues to reflect the
pressure of federal budget caps in the congressional appropriations process. In addition
to thirteen regular annual appropriations, emergency supplemental spending is a
discretionary appropriation that Congress and the President designate for natural
disasters, military contingencies, and peacekeeping. [Ref 4:p. 209]
This thesis examines emergency supplemental spending policies, processes, and
results beginning with the post-Vietnam era in 1974. Additionally, it provides an
analysis of both DoD and non-DoD emergency spending profiles, an overview of current
legislation decisions regarding military operations and their potential impact on
subsequent defense budgets.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The framework for the focus of this study encompasses several research questions
that introduce the definition of an emergency supplemental appropriation, how it
originates within the federal budget process and how it is designated. Beginning with the
Congressional Budget Reform Act of 1974, it is important to pose the question of how
budgetary regulations changed emergency supplemental spending, including the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990.
Second, the process of passing an Emergency Supplemental bill in Congress
offers several questions regarding the timing of the introduction of an emergency
supplemental spending bill and how it affects the annual appropriations cycle. From a
Department of Defense (DoD) perspective, it is important to ask how the timing of the
introduction of an emergency supplemental spending bill affects the DoD budget, how
Congress modifies supplemental and what kinds of items are added to supplemental
designated as "emergency".
In short, how does Congress react to DoD emergency supplemental? How does
the treatment of Non-DoD supplemental differ from DoD? On one hand, the impact of
their decisions regarding defense readiness, pork barrel spending and personnel present
key issues to be explored. On the other hand, equally as important is how DoD allocates
and costs out emergency supplemental regarding incremental costs for new equipment,
ranges of items and item thresholds.
From a historical perspective, emergency supplementals have caused interesting
and often, heated, debates since the Vietnam War era. As the debates continue in the
halls of Congress today, it is helpful to define and discuss the primary issues and their
effects on the emergency spending process, including similarities and differences during
Operation Desert Storm (1990-91), Balkans Support Operations in Bosnia (1992-98), and
ongoing NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The scope of this thesis is limited to an historical examination of emergency
appropriations from 1 974 to the present along with important legislation that has changed
the emergency supplemental bill process. The primary focus is emergency spending and
its direct impact upon the defense budget and other discretionary categories.
Additionally, the analysis includes an overview of the legislative tracking process and
provides insight into the future of federal budgeting procedures and the effects of
emergency spending. The period to be covered is approximately from 1974 to 2000, with
emphasis placed upon the 1990 to 2001 fiscal year budgets.
D. ORGANIZATION
This study addresses emergency appropriations and is primarily organized in five
areas of emphasis, including (1) policy issues, (2) process issues, (3) historical survey, (4)
data analysis, and (5) summary and conclusions.
1. Policy Issues
This chapter includes background to policies, definitions, and the impact of
emergency supplementals. Policy changes affected by the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Act of 1974 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
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of 1985 are discussed. In addition, policy issues regarding Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) agreements and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements are
discussed, since they have a significant role in emergency appropriations from a DoD
perspective.
2. Process Issues
This chapter includes background to the evolution of congressional processes
since the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 and under the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990. Congressional budget resolutions, Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) definitions, and the fiscal timing of emergency supplemental legislation are
examined.
3. Historical Survey
This chapter focuses on both the macro and micro views of several emergency
supplemental from fiscal year 1974 to 1999. From the research data attained,
supplemental appropriations bills are examined with fiscal and policy impacts on the
DoD budget during the period of 1974 to 1989: Post Vietnam/Reagan Build-Up; 1990 to
1991: Operation Desert Storm; 1992 to 1998: NATO Operations; and 1999 to Present:
Balkans Peacekeeping.
4. Data Analysis
This chapter provides comprehensive analysis of the historical survey data as
described in section (3). Through gathering, organizing, and analyzing these data,
conclusions regarding policy and process trends are provided on the basis of historical
significance.
5. Summary and Conclusions
A summary chapter provides conclusions and a comprehensive appreciation for
the historical context of emergency supplemental appropriations and their increasing
dynamic importance in congressional budgeting.
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II. EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS: BACKGROUND
A. CLOSE-UP: EMERGENCY FUNDING AND DOD TASKING DILEMMA
After several months of heated partisan wrangling in Congress, the FY 1999
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill was passed and signed into public law in
May 1999. The major portion of this $16.1 billion supplemental was allocated towards
reconstruction costs of Central American cities and villages in the wake of havoc
wreaked by Hurricane Mitch, along with emergency aid for Kosovo peacekeeping
operations for American forces in the Balkans. This emergency package is representative
of the typical loophole, pork barrel spending that evolved throughout the 1990's. Indeed
it is a process that Members of Congress have come to expect and Americans have come
to live with each mid-year during the federal budget cycle. Meanwhile, DoD
appropriations bills increasingly absorb the cost of these seemingly diplomatic aid
packages in the form of offsets established in the name of global peacekeeping, disaster
relief support, domestic emergencies and other para-military operations.
Furthermore, these congressional and military efforts to promote peace, justice,
and sustainable development in overseas regions often encounter unwelcome responses
from civil organizations. The Latin America Working Group (LAWG), a coalition of
several religious, human rights and policy development organizations, was troubled by
the fact that the emergency bill included $62 million toward DoD's New Horizons
Exercise programs, a U.S. Southern Command military relief and reconstruction
operation.
LAWG claims that:
Militaries may play a necessary role in the emergency phase of a natural
disaster, but encouraging the U.S. and Central American militaries to play
a role in reconstruction and development is neither efficient development
policy nor helpful for civil-military relations. [Ref. 1]
Regarding operations other than war (OOTW), Hasskamp called these "windows"
or "window-washing", i.e., important constabulary chores recognized as national policy
that tasks DoD to increasingly commit and deploy its troops to handle these new
missions. These so-called "unplanned" emergencies deplete fragile defense funds, often
causing the military to resubmit a modified annual authorization request or to request
discretionary account reimbursement. Moreover, the resulting funding/tasking dilemma
frequently causes critical suspensions in military training, readiness and operations,
which often evolve into protracted "emergencies" that siphon precious DoD budget
dollars away from efforts of the U.S. to maintain its national interests. Some argue
"emergencies" provide good training, but DoD experts suggest that civil affairs are not
like war and routinely degrade capability.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen has indeed recognized this ongoing
dilemma:
We are faced with a choice of reducing our commitment or reducing our
capability.... We're over committed and under funded. [Ref. 2:p. 14]
Whereas his predecessor, the Honorable Les Aspin, held a more diplomatic view:
Operations directed at alleviating human suffering and meeting the needs
of victims of social dislocation, economic strife, political conflict, or
natural disasters can, in some cases, be the best foreign policy instrument
available to the United States. [Ref. 2:p. 15]
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Therefore, a clear balance must be established between which "window-washing"
missions our military is called to fulfill and the escalating costs of non-defense
peacekeeping operations to American taxpayers. Consequently, our defense forces are
being called to shortchange their warfighting capability in order to accomplish more and
more politically mandated "emergencies" on a global scale. Thus the quest for
uniformity in classifying which emergencies require DoD participation is one that is
further explored in the next section.
B. DOD AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
"Peacekeeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."
-Boutros Boutros-Ghali [Ref. 2:p. 31]
As will be discussed in the following section, there is no precise definition for
"emergency" in budget process law. However, regarding military response to emergent
situations, McGrady outlines fundamental definitions within the broad topic of "complex
emergencies". He defines emergencies as "contingencies" or "crises" when referring to
both natural and man-made disasters. Complex emergencies are specifically defined as
"economic, political, or social disasters that are likely to cause conflict." [Ref. 3:p. 5]
All contingencies and complex emergencies incur operational costs that are
usually unplanned requirements. Besides typical funding provided to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in response to natural disasters such as
earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes and floods, emergency funding has encompassed
complex domestic, humanitarian and military requirements. Recent DoD military
taskings during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Bosnia in 1997 exhibit how defense-
related emergencies can be categorized into two specific areas: peacemaking and peace
enforcement.
Peacemaking operations are the result of diplomatic efforts used in facilitating
and sometimes intimidating opposing sides to arrive at a joint agreement. An example of
U.S. peacemaking operations occurred in 1994 when follow-on emergency funding was
provided to the Haitian government after extensive, time-consuming diplomacy was
supported by joint U.S. military operations during Operation Uphold Democracy. [Ref.
3:p. 62]
Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves military action to the extent of
supporting peacemaking operations, humanitarian operations, and securing stability in the
local environment. Emergency peacekeeping efforts require significant defense security
forces and humanitarian components. As has been demonstrated by U.S. forces in Bosnia
since 1997, defense security included constabulary duties under the United Nations aegis
until government stability was recently attained. Meanwhile, humanitarian relief in the
form of food, shelter, clothing and caring for displaced persons has consumed millions of
dollars in complex emergency aid due to economic and social chaos. [Ref. 3:p. 67]
Figure 1.1 below lists the 50 major operations in which U.S. naval forces
participated during the period of 1990 to 1997. As displayed in Table 1.1, inspection of
the operations (listed as "disasters") shows that:
• The duration of 12 operations lasted over a period of multiple years, 50%
of which were limited to a two-year period
• Refugee support missions averaged over 3.6 annually, occurring every
year during the period and peaking with 8 concurrent operations in 1994
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• The frequency of peacekeeping operations steadily increased between
1993 and 1997; 15 of 17 operations (88%) occurred during the period
• Mostly occurring in the early part of the decade, 17 of 18 natural disasters
were between 1990 and 1993
As can be discerned from review of these charts, some operations routinely occur
from year to year, while others are not as predictable.
Without doubt, unpredictability is the common element in all bona fide
emergencies. All disaster relief, peacekeeping and complex emergency situations also
have had unanticipated, unusually high levels of funding required for response. Further,
the extent of the eventual commitment can be hard to determine in terms of time,
resources and military personnel support. It is no wonder that Congress experiences
prolonged difficulties in classifying what actually constitutes a true emergency and what
measure of funding will be determined in a supplemental appropriations bill.
Nevertheless, Secretary Cohen stresses that deployments for emergency
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will continue for U.S. forces:
While we are not and cannot be the world's policeman, neither can we
become a prisoner of world events, isolated, tucked safely away in a
continental cocoon. [Ref. 2:p. 29]
C. EMERGENCIES AND EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS
A further complication arose because of the size of the deficit and efforts to
control it. In 1990, with the passage of the Budget Enforcement Act and spending caps,
Congress decided that new spending had to be offset with taxes or cuts in old spending.
This meant that supplemental could call for offsets or they could be reduced "dire"
11
Disaster Name Year Country
NEO/Evacitation/ Sharp Edge 1990 Liberia
Embassy Support Eastern Exit 1991 Somalia
Quick Lift 1991 Zaire
Silver Compass 1992 Liberia
Distant Runner 1994 Rwanda
United Shield 199S Somalia
Assured Response 1996 Liberia
Quick Response 1996 Central African Republic
Noble Obelisk 1997 Sierra Leone
Silver Wake 1997 Albania
Guardian retrieval 1997 Congo/Zaire
Refugees Provide Comfort 1991 -present Iraq
Safe Harbor/JTF 1991-1993 Cuba/Haitian refugees
GTMO
Able Manner 1993-1994 Cuban refugees
Amber Value 1994 Chinese migrants
Able Vigil 1994 Cuba
Support Hope 1994 Great Lakes Region
Safe Haven 1994-1995 Panama
Distant Haven 1994 Suriname
Sea Signal 1994-1996 Caribbean/Haiti
Safe Passage 199S Cuba
Guardian Assis- 1996 Rwanda and Congo
tance
JTF Marathon 1996 Wake Is.
Pacific Haven 1996-1997 Kurdish refugees/Guam
Provide Comfort 1996-1997 Iraq
Present Haven 1997 Cuba
Peacekeeping Multiple' 1 992 -present Bosnia
Restore/Continue 1992-1993 Somalia
Hope
Assured Lift 1997 Liberia






Hurricane OFA 1990 Guam
Mud Pack 1990 Phillipines
Sea Angel 1991 • Bangladesh
Balm Restore 1991 American Samoa
JTF Marinas 1992 Guam
JTF Eleuthrera 1992 Bahamas
Typhoon Paka 1997 Guam
Earthquake 1990 Philippines
1993 Guam
Drought Water Pitcher 1992 Micronesia
Provide Relief 1992-1993 Somalia
Volcano Fiery Vigil 1991 Philippines
Hot Rock 1992 Italy
Technological 1992 Honduras
a. Operations executed by U.S. Navy or Marine Corps forces; many more were planned.
For a detailed discussion of which operations were, or were not, included in the data-
base see [21,24). In addition to the operations defined there we exclude smaller-scale
operations such as fire fighting or search and rescue. We also exclude domestic opera-
tons with the exception of Pacific islands such as Guam or Samoa.
b. Non-combatant evacuation; this category also includes evacuation of embassy or
other personnel and embassy security operations. It does not include USMC (FAST) or
Navy (SEAL) embassy deployments.
c. Includes operations Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, Quick Lift, Deliberate Force, Joint
Endeavor., Joint Guard, Joint Forge
d. Included operations U.S. Support Group Haiti (Haiti Assistance Group), Support
Democracy, Uphold Democracy.
Figure 1.1. Major Operations in which Navy or Marine Corps Forces Participated




Refugees Peacekeeping Disease Natural
Disasters
Total
1990 1 1 1 6 9
1991 2 2 3 7
1992 1 2 2 6 11
1993 3 3 2 8
1994 1 8 2 11
1995 1 4 3 8
1996 2 5 3 10
1997 3 4 4 1 12
Total 11 29 17 1 18 76
Table 1.1. Analysis of Major Naval Operations 1990-1997. Source: [Ref. 3:pp.
155-156]
emergency supplemental requiring no offsets. This made it important to define
emergency.
According to Stanley E. Collender, Managing Director of the Federal Budget
Consulting Group, an emergency appropriation is defined as:
Discretionary appropriations that the President designates as "emergency
requirements" and which are similarly designated by Congress in
legislation subsequently enacted into law. [Ref 4:p. 202]
In short, since it is not clearly defined in budget law, an emergency is whatever
the President and Congress deem it to be. OMB Director Richard Darman said in 1991
that an emergency appropriation should be:
• A necessary expenditure—an essential or vital expenditure, not one that is
merely useful or beneficial
• Sudden
—
quickly coming into being, not building up over time
• Urgent—a pressing and compelling need requiring immediate action
• Unforeseen—not predictable or seen beforehand as a coming need (an
emergency that is part of an aggregate level of emergencies, particularly
when normally estimated in advance would not be "unforeseen")
• Not permanent—the need is temporary in nature [Ref 4:p. 87]
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Many in Congress have believed that the emergency supplemental funding for
military and peacekeeping operations should be foreseen and should, therefore, be
included in regular defense appropriations bills.
Sperry and Vanhelmond state the use of emergency funds should be strictly
managed in accordance with firmly established budgeting guidelines. Any supplemental
appropriations that the President and Congress deem as emergent requirements should
result from "defining exactly what constitutes an emergency and establishing mandatory
offsets (dollar-for-dollar reductions in other spending) for all bona fide emergency
increases." [Ref. 5:p. 3]
Furthermore, they outline emergency criteria that pose a familiar fundamental
question, "What is an emergency?" They propose the following list of what emergencies
must involve:
• an imminent threat to life, property, or national security;
• an unanticipated situation; or
• a temporary occurrence. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
These basic criteria could help legitimize the true urgency of an emergent request,
forcing lawmakers to consider the cost of incurring a potentially painful offsetting budget
reduction. However, realizing that supplemental are a necessary budgeting vehicle to
anticipate emergencies, Sperry and Vanhelmond also recommend steps to properly
remedy Congress' use of emergency spending by:




Allowing Members to highlight questionable supplemental spending by
using points of order (and a supermajority to override any point of order)
against individual line items with supplemental funding bills
Limiting supplement budget authority to the levels that can be obligated
during the current budget year by requiring that detailed week-by-week
spending plan be submitted with each request
Requiring that the relevant executive branch Cabinet secretary and
Congressional committees(s) of jurisdiction specify, in a report to
accompany the supplemental spending bill, why the required funding was
not anticipated during the normal budget process and what spending will
be cut to offset the requested spending [Ref. 5:p. 4]
Indeed, Sperry and Vanhelmond insightfully consider the necessity and budgeting
wisdom of establishing guidelines for emergency appropriation legislation. Moreover,
they propose that the congressional lawmakers "remind themselves why spending caps
were instituted in the first place- to block wasteful spending and balance the budget- they
will act decisively to prevent the use of emergency spending for ever more inappropriate
reasons." [Ref. 5:p.4]
D. SUMMARY
Budgetary discipline, planning and discretion are the hallmarks of the normal
appropriations process. Although emergencies are unpredictable, uncontrollable, and not
well defined in budgetary process law, they should not be entirely exempt from Congress
employing the aforementioned budgetary characteristics, especially regarding defense
appropriations bills. Disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and complex military
operations are the main components of emergency supplemental, however, not all of
these missions are planned and funded within the defense budget. When this happens, as
in the case of the OOTW, DoD becomes over-committed and under-funded without
timely reimbursement.
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Peter Sperry, an expert in federal budgetary affairs at the Thomas A. Roe Institute
for Economic Policy, suggests that the "floodgates to supplemental spending should be
left for only true emergencies" and "the spending priorities that are truly important will
survive the regular appropriations process; those that do not should not be given back-
door access to the federal Treasury through a less-than-urgent supplemental
appropriations bill." [Ref. 6:p. 3]
In the next chapter, a historical perspective of congressional action regarding
policies and processes of emergency supplemental appropriations bills is discussed.
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III. POLICY AND PROCESS ISSUES
A. BACKGROUND
"/ am confident that America will continue to respond to their [South Vietnam's]
plight with the generosity so characteristic of our national tradition. " [Ref. 7:p. 29]
Henry Kissinger
On April 21, 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified before the House
Appropriations Committee (HAC) of the 94 th Congress regarding Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam for fiscal
year 1975. Led by Chairman George H. Mahon from Texas, the HAC had commenced
hearings to decide on the authorization of $200 million in emergency military aid and an
additional $165 million in economic and humanitarian aid for South Vietnam. Even as
General Frederick C. Weyand, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, who went before the HAC
requesting an additional $357 million in assistance, was presenting his testimony in
Washington, Saigon was falling to the North Vietnamese. This emergent requirement
would primarily be used to rebuild and upgrade light infantry units that protected remote
villages against the advancing Communist forces from the north.
After 25 years of dedication to curtailing the expansion of communism
throughout Southeast Asia, the United States would not be sending additional combat
troops to Vietnam. During that period, Congress appropriated over $155 billion to
support the mission. They were now in a period of increasing budget deficit awareness-
over 10 years of "emergency" foreign assistance and "Great Society" domestic spending
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and now reluctant to authorize additional funds for South Vietnam. It was now certain
that Congress would not be providing an unlimited supply of emergency funds and
foreign aid to this deteriorating political and military crisis. However, the question
remained whether or not the United States should continue to help the Government of
South Vietnam through limited economic and humanitarian aid.
With diplomatic eloquence, Secretary Kissinger addressed the committee:
For that government to pursue its objectives, which we assume will be
announced in due time, it will need our support. Thus our objectives in the
military or political sense are indeed limited, as they must be. But
however limited, those objectives must be pursued with urgency for,
despite the complex history of this conflict and our role in it, the
fundamental issue we now face is quite clear: South Vietnam has nowhere
else to turn. Without our help it has no hope even of moderating the pace
of events which it has bravely resisted for many years. [Ref. 7:p. 30]
This is an early illustration of how Congress began to implement new emergency
supplemental appropriation reviews for the first time in the modern budgeting era.
Throughout the Vietnam War, Congress passed enormous supplemental at a monthly
rate exceeding $1 billion without incident. As Major General Leonard B. Taylor
commented in subcommittee proceedings of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)
in 1972, "I think it was common knowledge now that the prevailing trend at the time was,
'When a doubt exists, charge it to Vietnam'." [Ref. 8:p. 25]
Indeed, the concept of the "blank check" adopted by Secretary of Defense
McNamara dominated budget policy and everyday practice of how Congress exercised its
"power of the purse." As a result, Congress' general attitude toward deficit spending was
reckless; escalating budget deficits permeated the political and fiscal environment. Such
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spending was a political "safety valve," making it possible to soften the harsh choices of
program cutbacks or tax increases. [Ref. 9: p. 2]
During the waning months of the Vietnam conflict, both the federal budgeting
system and deficit management were in a severe state of disrepair. Additionally, there
was no peace dividend due to the Vietnam War's non-conformity to budgetary patterns of
previous wars. Uncontrollable spending skyrocketed from 59% in 1967 to 72% of the
federal budget in 1974. Thus, to counter the battle of deficit spending at a time when
presidential impoundments were also threatening Congress' autonomy over the federal
purse, budget reform legislation was established and power was restored to the
appropriations committees. Such changes were to provide new budgeting framework and
discipline that was previously non-existent in the legislative process.
Allen Schick offers insight to these imminent changes in 1974 regarding federal
budgetary treatment of supplemental spending:
Legislative conflict and budgetary impotence—the twin results of
congressional grasping for spending control—were powerful spurs in the
quest for a new budget process. While leading Members of Congress
were divided on the type of system that should be installed, they were
united in their determination to find a way out of their budgetary malaise.
[Ref. 10:p. 42]
As for Vietnam, the U.S. refusal to fund the supplemental in 1975 was the final
signal that it would no longer support the conflict. Although small in terms of dollars, its
foreign policy impact was enormous: South Vietnam fell in April 1975. Meanwhile, at
home, the attention of budgeteers had turned to budget reform. Thus supplemental also
have a symbolic significance irrespective of their size.
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B. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL
ACT OF 1974 AND GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS
1. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
Conflict among members of Congress was so protracted and so intense, Allen
Schick claims that the period preceding 1974 can legitimately be characterized as a
Seven-Year Budget War:
The outcome of that war was the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. This
act can be viewed as a treaty that sought to bring equilibrium to the annual
budget cycle by redefining power relationships among the old participants
and creating new participants to develop better information and to control
and channel the inevitable budgetary conflicts. [Ref. 10:p. 13]
Since the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
numerous steps have been taken to deter budgetary effects of emergency supplemental
spending, including dedicated efforts to improve planning in the appropriations process.
While not addressing possible deficit consequences, the Budget Act of 1974 allowed for
"unanticipated, uncontrollable expenditures"—contingency amounts that were reserved
for potential supplemental in both the President's budget request figures and those in the
appropriations bill. [Ref. 9:p. 2]
Tyszkiewicz and Daggett address these contingency amounts, whether or not
emergency requirements are truly "unanticipated":
Prior to passage of the Act, supplemental funding bills were regularly used
to provide funding for day-to-day agency operations
—
pay raises for DOD
and other federal employees, for example, were usually funded in
supplemental appropriations measures. In recent years, supplemental
appropriations bills have been used mainly to provide funding for
unanticipated expenses—though there is sometimes an argument about
whether the requirements should have been anticipated or not. [Ref. 1 l:p.
43]
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Overall, the Budget Act of 1974 has had a positive effect with regard to
emergency supplemental spending. Schick stated that since 1975, "Congress has been
making budgetary war and peace within the budget process it established in the previous
year. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 altered budgetary roles and relationships
with Congress, bringing new participants into the process and compelling older
participants to function within new procedural and substantive rules." [Ref. 10:p. 3]
Indeed, one of the highlights of the Budget Act was the formation of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congress' own budget agency. The major priorities
of the CBO are assisting Budget, Appropriations, House Ways and Means, and Senate
Finance Committees within their jurisdiction, reviewing the president's budget and other
proposals (including emergency supplemental appropriations; and issuing reports on
options for deficit reductions. [Ref. 10:pp. 132-133]
CBO's role in assisting Congress with a budget resolution begins upon receipt of
the president's budget. This budget resolution is a rule that essentially becomes
Congress' spending plan; it is not submitted for presidential approval.
As McCaffery describes, the legislative budget process "has a beginning,
middle and an end. The beginning starts with the receipt of the President's
budget in early February and concludes with the passage of a concurrent
resolution on the budget in mid-April. The middle is that period of time
usually from April through mid-September when committees review and
markup appropriations bills and the House and Senate debate and amend
the appropriation bills and pass them. The end occurs when the same bill
is passed in each chamber, usually in the form of a vote on a joint
conference committee report, and sent to the President and signed." [Ref.
14:p. 10-11]
The CBO was established to play a vital role in assisting congressional
committees throughout the legislative budget calendar and reducing the federal deficit in
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the same way OMB assists the President. As discussed in the following section, the
growth of budget deficits in the 1980's led to significant changes in congressional
budgeting with the passage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I.
2. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Acts of 1985 & 1987
More commonly referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Acts I and
II, these Acts introduced rescissions as an offsetting measure to allow Congress to
constrain the effects of emergency supplemental spending. A rescission is a presidential
proposal (impoundment) to cancel previously appropriated budget authority, requiring
both House and Senate approval within forty-five days. Otherwise, the appropriated
budget authority remains intact if it does not gain congressional approval. [Ref. 4:p. 208]
Reflecting on rescissions, Schick concluded:
Rescissions invite conflict between the president and Congress. Every one
is a presidential demand that Congress cancel resources it had previously
appropriated. By implication, rescissions tell Congress that it erred the
first time around and that it wasted government funds. This is not a
message that appeals to legislators, especially when it comes from a
president who has different budget priorities. [Ref. 13:p. 46]
Specifically, GRH amended the Budget Act of 1974 by forcing end of year deficit
targets that would gradually decline over a five-year period. In budget planning,
Congress had to meet these established targets or enact across the board cuts.
Figure 3.1 below shows the impact of rescissions on supplemental appropriations
as a share of total discretionary budget authority from 1985 to 1999. Since these Acts
were established, the President has suggested and Congress has enacted rescissions to
fully offset nonemergency supplemental spending in most years.
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As displayed in the chart, these rescissions seem to offset non-emergency
supplemental during this period. After the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990, the balance
of supplemental minus rescissions declined from about 1% of total discretionary budget
authority to its lowest level (-4%) in 1995. Similarly, the profile of emergency
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Figure 3.1. Discretionary Supplemental Net of Rescissions (As a share of total
discretionary budget authority). Source: [Ref. 9:p. 5]
Demonstrating a lack of budgetary discipline and responsibility, Members of
Congress undermined the deficit targets introduced by the GRH Acts of 1985 and 1987,
including tactical gimmickry such as approving unrealistic estimates for outlays and
revenues. In 1991, the House passed the Persian Gulf War supplemental bill for $4.1
billion and designated $801 million as emergency funds. However, within these fenced
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emergency funds, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) detected several small
expenditures that were not bona fide emergencies, including $1 million for the United
States Information Agency and $7.4 million for several Commerce Department agencies.
Although insignificant amounts, they caused OMB to threaten a sequester and to
subsequently set forth new requirements for all supplemental requests, e.g., that agencies
submit recommended offsetting rescissions with "fully justified explanations" of why or
why not provisions could be met. [Ref. 15:p. 10-11]
Thurber argues that GRH simply failed in all respects, including budgeting for
emergency supplemental appropriations. He stated that across-the-board spending cuts
known as sequestration, failed to "single out" discretionary spending programs under the
auspices of the Appropriations Committee. It also slowed the process for Appropriators
to push supplemental bills to passage and forced legislators to impose constraints on
available resources between fiscal years. Thurber sums up his view on the failed attempts
of budget reform:
In spite of their goals, the Budget and Impoundment Act and GRH did not
curb growth of federal spending, bring an end to the growth in
uncontrollable [emergency supplemental] spending; reduce the deficit,
force Congress to complete budgeting on time, reorder national spending
priorities, allow Congress to control fiscal policy, or eliminate the need for
continuing resolutions. [Ref. 12:p. 65]
To remedy such loophole spending that occurred between 1974 and 1989,
Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.
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C. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1990 (BEA)
1. Background
Since the establishment of the BEA, Congress has provided DoD with emergency
appropriations each year for military contingency operations and for costs of disaster
repairs. While budget reform has often caused controversy among Members of Congress,
the provision of emergency funds is usually approved. Sometimes these funds are
partially or even totally offset by imposed rescissions.
Stephen Daggett states that the term, "emergency appropriations" specifically
refers to the terms specified under the BEA and the previous budget reform Acts. The
BEA also provided some flexibility to respond to "emergencies" by permitting spending
to exceed budget caps under certain conditions. Specifically, BEA amended [GRH],
which increased discretionary spending caps by the designated amounts deemed by both
the President and Congress. [Ref. 16:p. 1]
As Thurber points out, budget reform itself is a quid pro quo process that
introduces new challenges that keep emergency appropriations in the center of
controversial debates.
One of the most visible changes from the 1990 budget reforms was the
elimination of fixed deficit targets as established in GRH I and II. But
other innovations—such as categorical sequesters, pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) provisions on taxes and spending, and firewalls
—
put major
restrictions on the jurisdiction and authority of the Appropriations
Committees. [Ref. 12:p. 66]
Indeed, such innovations as PAYGO and firewalls escalated the visibility of
emergency supplemental in the light of discretionary spending categories, especially
within DoD. As Davis discusses, the BEA originally established separate discretionary
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limits for three categories: domestic, defense, and international. These separate limits
applied for fiscal years 1991 through 1993, after which only combined limits on total
discretionary spending remained in effect. The separate limits were referred to as
"firewalls," since spending could not be shifted among the categories. [Ref. 17:p. 19]
Hence, categorical offsets and rescissions also maintain a heightened visibility as
a result of BEA reforms. These reforms also reduced the flexibility of fiscal guidance in
case of disasters, emergencies and within the dynamic state of world affairs.
Nonetheless, Appropriations Committees have been given the authority to consider
exemptions to spending caps due to emergent requirements.
As addressed in the next section regarding designated emergency spending,
exemptions were clearly demonstrated in 1991, when expenditures for the Persian Gulf
War were designated as an "emergency need" and were not counted against the defense
spending ceiling as were the emergency funds for flood victims in 1997. [Ref. 12:p. 67]
2. Congressional Budget Office and Emergency Spending Under the
BEA
It is also helpful to introduce a profile of Congressional Budget Office's (CBO)
analysis of emergency spending under the BEA from 1991 to 1998. As the first chart in
Figure 3.2 illustrates below, emergency spending is compared by type of appropriation,
regular and supplemental. Regular appropriations bills provide budget authority for the
upcoming fiscal year or, if it has already started, for the year in progress. Supplemental
appropriations provide additional budget authority for the current fiscal year when the
regular appropriation is insufficient or when activities have not been provided for in the
regular appropriation. [Ref. 18:p. 130]
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Clearly, the bulk of emergency appropriations is in the supplemental category.
From 1991 to 1998, emergency funding contained in regular appropriations comprised
6.5% of the total of both supplemental and regular appropriations. Excluding the Persian
Gulf War funds, regular emergency supplementals represented 9.6% of the total.
In the second chart, when divided into defense and non-defense categories, the
defense portion is slightly less than non-defense, excluding the $44.4 billion for
Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. Table 3.1 contains supporting data for the charts
in Figure 3.2.
3. Emergency Appropriations and Budget Processes
As a built-in safeguard, the BEA also required a "look-back" at each legislative
session to insure that the appropriators did not exceed the spending limits. According to
Thurber, other significant changes made by the BEA included "requiring the concurrence
of the president on emergency spending exempt from the spending caps. This provision
enables OMB to bargain effectively with Congress over individual items in supplemental
appropriations bills, [and is equivalent to] a line-item veto." [Ref. 12:p. 67]
Moreover, Doyle and McCaffery elaborate on Congress' decision to exempt
emergency funds allocated for the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991:
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Figure 3.2. Designated Emergency Spending, 1991-1998. Source: [Ref. 9:p.4]
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Designated Emergency Spending
Total 45,846 15,708 5,336 12,947 7,717 5,047 9,236 5,540
By Type of Appropriation
Regular
Supplemental
By Type of Spending
Defense
Nondefense
1,000 107 218 1,529 1,774 692 1,612 5
44,846 15,601 5,118 11,418 5,943 4,355 7,624 5,535
44,337 7,527 642 1,497 2,448 980 2,107 2,832
1,509 8,181 4,694 11,450 5,269 4,067 7,129 2,708
Total
Contingent Emergency Spending
460 693 918 613 4 307 479
Regular Appropriations 314 660 303 613 307 300
Supplemental Appropriations 146 33 615 4 179
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
Table 3.1. Designated And Contingent Emergency Spending, 1991-1998. (In
Millions of Dollars of Budget Authority). Source: [Ref. 9:p. 4-5]
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Mid-Year Revision revealed major changes in the near term profile of the
deficit between 1991 and 1992, as well as some technical reestimations of
moderate size. But these changes had no impact on the budget process,
since the BEA had severed the direct link between deficit increases and
sequestration. Emergencies—Desert Storm/Desert Shield and sharply
increased funding requirements for the savings and loan bailout—were
causing the turbulence, but these were outside the calculus of the BEA.
Although these emergencies drove the deficit up, a budget reform
incapable of accommodating them would not have survived long. Thus
substantial changes in budget policy occurred because of emergencies
without disrupting the main budget arena, and there was very little of the
process constriction of previous years attributable to these events: [Ref.
15:p. 6]
D. SUMMARY
Over the past quarter-century, emergency supplemental appropriations and their
effects upon the Department of Defense budget have increasingly become a significant
topic of debate among members of Congress. Subject to an evolving budget reform
process through congressional Acts in 1974, 1985, 1987 and 1990, the impact of
emergency supplementals upon regular appropriation levels has become more visible to
legislators. While comprising over $76.8 billion or 56 per cent of the entire amount of
supplementals in the 1990's, defense emergency spending has also become a critical area
of concern regarding the effect on readiness and long-term budgets at the expense of
peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
During each Midyear Review within the federal budget cycle, new emergency
supplemental bills are introduced and contain the potential to spoil the fiscal discipline
constraints placed upon an already under-funded DoD. Indeed, some "dire emergencies"
have reflected the ever-changing need for budget policy and process reforms due to
unanticipated, uncontrollable and unforeseen requests.
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IV. EMERGENCY APPROPRIATIONS: PROCESS AND DATA
ANALYSIS
A. PROCESS ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY OF A SUPPLEMENTAL
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bills can also be titled Mid-Year
Spending Bills and Disaster Relief Bills. Typically introduced as a House Report to the
House Appropriations Committee in the February to July timeframe, the bills are retitled
as Acts, e.g., 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. After a series of
amendments, bills go up for passage in the House. Upon a favorable vote, the bills are
transferred to the Senate Appropriations Committee, where they undergo amendments to
the House-approved appropriation levels. After a series of debates, the Senate will also
typically approve, add-in or cut funding levels from the President's original request for
emergency funding.
Prior to the President signing a supplemental into law, a Conference Report is
issued and passed by both houses. The President signs emergency supplemental acts
regarding supplemental that are typically introduced in mid-year on the fiscal calendar,
prior to the end of the fiscal year in September.
To illustrate, Public Law No. 102-28 was signed into law in April 1991 as the
Desert Storm Emergency Supplemental. The president's original request, submitted in
early March 1991, was for $71 billion. The House Committee approved the bill within
two days for $43 billion for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The House was acting on
good faith from foreign governments' promises for $53.3 billion in reimbursements at the
time that they were part of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. On March 19, 1991,
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the Senate Committee also considered the reimbursements and made additional
adjustments of approximately $3 billion, approving a $46.2 billion bill on March 22,
1991. The President signed the bill into law on April 10, 1991. The following section
takes a comprehensive look into supplemental over the past quarter-century.
B. ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTALS: 1974-2000
Figure 4.1 below is a Supplemental Tracking Profile covering the legislative
tracking of sixty-one supplemental bills during the period of 1974 through 1999. These
budgetary data were attained through exhaustive research applied to each individual
supplemental among twenty-five separate annual congressional chronicles. Data were
gathered through analyzing the legislative history of each public law that included the
passage of emergency supplemental appropriations bills. The focus of the manual effort
was to acquire data by fiscal year and the recorded public law number.
The legislative tracking methodology included intense research of all significant
dates within the supplemental bill process. Among the critical dates, dates of bill
submission and presidential signature proved to be the most meaningful. Other important
dates were also recorded. These included dates of House and Senate Committees, date
introduced on the House and Senate floors, and dates when Conference Reports were
issued and passed by both the House and Senate. For specific dates, see Appendix.
After tracking each supplemental 's history, a comprehensive bar chart of all sixty-
two supplemental was developed as a pictorial to show trends and patterns in the
supplemental process.
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Note in Figure 4.1 that each emergency supplemental starting in calendar year
(CY) 1974 has a designated fiscal year(s) (FY) for which bills were submitted. The
corresponding light gray horizontal bar represents the start of the period that the bill was
introduced until its passage by both House and Senate Committees. The adjacent dark
gray section corresponds to the final month it attained Conference Report Approval and
the President's signature, signified by a Public Law Number. Additionally, the patterned
bars represent the seven cases that a regular supplemental appropriations bill was
introduced, passed, and signed into law.
Upon inspection of the profile, it seems that most supplemental are introduced
mid-year from February through March and are approved by the end of the fiscal year in
September. The typical "dire" emergency supplemental takes approximately three
months from the time it is introduced on the House and Senate floors until the President
signs it.
However, occasional early submission, political debate and heated legislation can
cause the timeline to be protracted. The bills with the longest congressional action period
often months were in 1978, 1980, and 1991.
For example, in 1980, Public Law No. 96-249 was held up in Congress for ten
months prior to the President signing the appropriations bill into law. In that year, the
Senate initiated a $3 billion Food Stamp Emergency Bill which was considered for
passage with a concurrent $16.9 Emergency Defense Supplemental.
In 1991, during the period of Desert Storm, a FEMA natural disaster bill to
farmers for $6.9 billion caused Public Law No. 102-229 to overlap fiscal years after a
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ten-month process prior to presidential signature. Thus, the majority of the sixty-one
supplemental bills analyzed was carried out by the end of their respective fiscal years.
SUPPLEMENTAL TRACKING PROFILE 1974-1999
cv FY
LAW
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[CONFERENCE REPORT APPROVAL/ PRESIDENT SIGNED
INTRODUCED, APPROVED AND SIGNED BY PRESIDENT
Figure 4.1. Supplemental Tracking Profile 1974-1999. Source: [Ref. 21]
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C. DOD VIEWPOINT: PROCESS TIMING AND EFFECTS
As shown in Table 4.1 below, an analysis of all sixty-one supplemental bills also
yielded convincing data that the emergency appropriations "safety valve" effect has been
increasingly applied to DoD. By compiling all supplemental funding amounts and their
respective DoD portions, one can determine the percentage of the DoD budget that
emergency supplemental represent. Throughout the period from 1974 to 1999, $82.29
billion (19.1%) of all supplemental appropriations were allocated to DoD. This figure
also represents a less significant 1.38% of the cumulative DoD budgets within the period.
The 1990's saw a substantial increase in emergency funding towards defense
operations, including support operations in Panama and Nicaragua in 1990 ($4.3 billion),
Desert Storm in 1991 ($42.6 billion), Operation Restore Hope in Somalia ($3.5 billion),
defense peacekeeping in Bosnia ($4.1 billion), and a cumulative total exceeding $35.8
billion for defense-related spending in the late 1990's.
Table 4.2 below focuses on the bottom line from the Supplemental Appropriations
Analysis Chart (Table 4.1). It emphasizes the magnitude of the 1991 Desert Storm
Supplemental. By subtracting out the $42.6 billion from the $82.3 billion total, the
modified DoD portion results in $39.7 billion or only 6.5% of total supplemental . While
the Desert Storm Supplemental represented 12.8% of the FY 1991 budget, its omission
from the total reflects that only 0.67 % of emergency supplemental affected DoD from
1974 to 1999.
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1996 5051 982 265.014
1997 8900 2100 266,217
1998 6100 2800 272.370
1998 20800 1859
1
1999 14500 10900 288.117
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Total $430,354 $82,293 $5,971,164 19.1% 1.38%
1991
Supplemental
42,600 42,600 332,228 0.7% 12.8%
New Total 387,754 39,693 5,971,164 6.5% 0.67%
Table 4.2. FY 1991 Desert Storm Supplemental Analysis. Source: [Ref. 21]
Because spending limits have capped total discretionary spending below inflation-
adjusted levels throughout the 1990's, many policymakers feel that those limits can
encourage relatively higher levels of emergency spending since such spending is
effectively exempt from the caps. Increasing levels have heightened their concern. [Ref.
19:p. 11]
The timing of introduction of the bills and replenishment back into the DoD
budget has caused some Members of Congress to consider emergency supplemental the
"preferred method to evade budget discipline." [Ref. 15:p. 11]
Each year in the late September or early October timeframe, budget submissions
are submitted to DoD and OMB for the next fiscal year to be contained in the President's
budget and for presentation to Congress in the following February. Although DoD
begins executing new fiscal year money on 1 October, it can encounter unforeseen
emergency requirements early in the fiscal year that were not in that year's budget. To
remedy the dilemma of executing the President's directive with limited resources, DoD
borrows from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account against fourth quarter
spending plans. DoD must depend upon an emergency supplemental being passed early
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enough in the fiscal year so that it can allocate the money and execute the spending plans
against which it had previously borrowed.
Supplementals that get passed in late August or early September would make this
difficult for DoD to execute; most supplementals are passed between April and August.
Late congressional action and a desire to keep from confusing Members of Congress over
the new budget or any emergency supplementals has led DoD to manage the time of the
bill submission so that it occurs after the main budget has been presented. Indeed timing
issues are important, but the disasters that drive supplementals cannot be relied upon to
occur at the same time each year.
In summary, DoD does its best to carry out the President's orders by borrowing
from O&M funds. Afterwards, it goes back to Congress for reimbursement.
D. NON-DOD EMERGENCIES AND PORK BARREL POLITICS
As cited in the CBO Testimony on Budgeting for Emergency Spending, a
combination of increasing incidents of disasters coupled with changes in federal budget
practices have led to new levels of increased emergency supplemental requests:
Since 1991, domestic spending has been high relative to the disaster-
related spending shown in the 1970s and 1980s. Some analysts would
attribute that to excesses resulting from tight discretionary caps and the
existence of a safety valve. [Ref. 9:p. 6]
An historical viewpoint regarding domestic spending for disasters is illustrated in
Figure 4.2 below. Upon inspection of the graph, the data reflect that emergency
supplemental spending related only to natural disasters such as the Mount St. Helens
eruption in 1980, Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989. Since 1991,
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emergency spending for purposes other than natural disasters, including both regular and
supplemental appropriations have been allocated to disasters such as the Los Angeles
Riots in 1992.
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Figure 4.2. Domestic Supplemental Spending for Disasters and Post- 1991
Supplemental Emergency Spending. Source: [Ref. 9:p.6]
Nevertheless, this safety valve can be an invitation to Members of Congress and
their parochial interests for local constituents, i.e., pork barrel politics. As a result of the
social unrest in Los Angeles in 1992, Congress approved a $1.1 billion nationwide (pork
barrel) Urban Aid package, over $600,000 above the emergent requirement.
Ron Paul suggests emergency spending bills are nothing but pork barrel politics.
He believes Congress must "adhere to its existing fiscal year budget, just as families and
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businesses must operate within their own budgets." He bluntly calls emergency
supplemental spending bills "dangerous, wasteful, and unnecessary".
In addition to non-defense emergencies, he sharply criticizes overseas spending as
well. Recently, over $1.3 billion was provided to Columbia, Bolivia, and Ecuador for a
counternarcotics "emergency". Paul argues,
Our nation should not be spending billions of dollars and sending 60
military helicopters to the Colombian Army and National Police to
escalate our failed drug war. We risk another Nicaragua when we meddle
in the internal politics and military activities of a foreign nation. Sending
expensive helicopters to Colombia is the worst kind of pork-barrel
politics- helicopters are ineffective weapons of war, as we have seen in
Vietnam and Somalia. [Ref. 20:p. 1]
Meanwhile in Kosovo, ongoing military action in the form of peacekeeping
operations, carries an ongoing $2.1 billion price tag per year. Paul also points out that
these operations are really acts of war requiring congressional approval.
Moreover, our national sovereignty is threatened when we place our
troops under UN Command. We don't need to spend more money on
Kosovo or any other foreign war the UN deems deserving. Time and time
again we have seen the disastrous consequences of meddling in wars
which do not involve our national interests...UN peacekeeping doesn't
work, and we should not be spending billions of dollars in emergency
funds perpetuating our involvement. [Ref. 20:p. 1]
E. SUMMARY
With respect to the DoD budget, emergency supplemental are an ever-increasing
item in the federal budget appropriations process. Introduced during midyear budget
wrangling, the amounts and impact of emergency loophole spending escalate as Congress
fails to exercise its budgetary discipline. During the past quarter-century, over sixty
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supplemental bills have been introduced to address national emergencies, both defense
and non-defense.
While emergency funding for Operation Desert Storm was exempt from the
discretionary spending caps at the time the BEA went into effect, defense appropriations
continue to be augmented by emergency appropriations as the number of worldwide
military contingencies increase and American commitments expand.
Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are bona fide emergencies,
however, the ongoing funneling of taxpayer dollars into such commitments goes well
beyond the definition of true emergencies.
Lastly, pork barrel politics erode good budget discipline at the cost of future
defense dollars. Indeed, "pork-barreling" encourages individual Members to hide their
pet projects in bills. In Congress, 'the powers that be' dole out spending for Members'
personal projects to garner their vote for the spending bills. The result is always higher
and more wasteful spending." [Ref. 19:p. 2]
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The focus of this study is built upon the framework of defining the emergency
appropriations from a Department of Defense perspective and how they are designated
within the federal budget process. Beginning with a background to the FY2000
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill and the definition of complex emergencies,
peacemaking and peace enforcement, it has become clear that such designated operations
represent national interests and consume substantial financial resources. Moreover, the
congressional interpretations of bona fide emergencies were discussed, providing
essential elements to define true emergencies in the context of supplemental
appropriations. Indeed, budgetary discipline, planning, and discretion have become the
trademarks of sound emergency legislation. The fact that emergencies are
uncontrollable, unforeseeable, and not well defined in budget law makes all emergencies
"complex".
Since the Vietnam War and including today's Kosovo peacekeeping operations,
emergency assistance has been a salient topic for debate among the Members of
Congress. Four major Acts of budgetary reform have treated emergencies as a significant
category within the appropriations process. Meanwhile, reduced defense budgets and
offsets from discretionary DoD accounts have amplified the negative impact on defense
readiness.
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After analyzing sixty-one supplemental bills from the period of 1974 to 1999, it is
clear that emergency appropriations comprise a significant portion of all supplemental
and DoD budget amendments. Over the past quarter-century, the mid-year pattern
remains true to lawmakers, as supplemental funding level debates reach their climax in
late summer each year. Furthermore, the ongoing quest for a consistent definition of
"dire emergency" continues to allow pork barrel politics to play a large role in the
supplemental appropriations process. The hallmarks of sound budgeting rely on the
loophole of designating "emergencies."
B. CONCLUSIONS
While the portion of defense-related emergency appropriations has been relatively
small over the period since the Vietnam War, the lion's share has accumulated over the
last decade since the Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, defense budgets have stagnated at
a time when it appears that the frequency of complex emergencies continues to steadily
increase. Peacekeeping operations have a severe impact on DoD budgets and defense
readiness. The constant need to augment the DoD budget with "emergency" spending is
a counteractive budgetary scheme. Moreover, it lends to Congress loosening the federal
purse strings and allowing pork-barrel politics to upset the balance of true emergencies
and defense readiness.
Thus, it is imperative that Congress exercise good budgetary discipline regarding
emergency supplemental appropriations. It should require agencies to improve planning
for emergent situations in order to avoid the mid-year plus-ups of creating veritable new
budgets. By implementing these practices, Congress can avoid mortgaging future
defense readiness and still support the military's role in global emergency operations.
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Irrespective of improvements in budget planning, it should be recognized that some level
of supplemental appropriations will always be necessary to meet true budget
emergencies.
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APPENDIX. LEGISLATIVE TRACKING OF EMERGENCY
SUPPLEMENTALS






























1974 74 93-305 4-Apr 4-Apr 10-Apr 3-May 7-Mav 4-Jun 5-Jun 8-Jun
1974 1 74 93-321 17-Jun 11-Jun 24-Jun 25-Jun 26-Jun 30-Jun
1974 75 93-554 25-Sep 25-Sep 2-Ocl 9-Oct 20-Nnv 16-Dec 16-Dec 27-Dec
l'>74 75 93-624 17-Dec I7-Dcc 18-Dcc 18-Dec 19-Dec 19-Dec 19-Dec 3-Jan
1975 75 94-06 18-Feb 18-Feh 20-Feb 25-Feb 26-Feb 27-Feh 27-Feb 28-Feb
1975 75 94-17 26-Mar 10-Apr 15-Apr 17-Apr 18-Apr 21-Apr 21-Apr 24-Apr
1975 75 94-32 10-Apr 10-Apr 15-Apr 14-May 20-May ::-Mj» 22-May 11-Jun 12-Jun
1975 76 V4-15T 7 -N '" 7-Ni.v 13-Nov 5-Dec 10-Dec 12-Dec IS-Dec I5-Dec 18-Dec
1976 76 94-252 9-Feh 1 1-Feb 18-Feb 19-Feh 26-Feb 22-Mar 25-Mar 25-Mar 30-Mar
1976 76 94-266 31-Mar 2-Apr 5-Apr S-Apr 9-Apr 7-Apr 1 2-Apr 12-Apr 15-Apr
1976 76 94-303 9-Apr 9-Apr 13-Apr 6-May 12-May 13-May 18-May 19-May 1-Jun
1976 76 94-438 15-Sep 17-Sep 21 -Sep 23-Sep 28-Sep 28-Sep 311-Sep 30-Sep 30-Sep




1977 77 95-16 24-Mar 28-Mar 29-Mar 29-Mar
[
1-Apr
197S 78 95-240 28-Sep 28-Sep 25-Oct 28-Ocl 28-Ocl 8-N«v 28-Feb 7 -Dec 7-Mar
1978 78 95-255 16-Mar 20-Mar 22-Mar 23-Mar 4-Apr
1978 78 95-330 23-May 28-Jun 11-Jul | 31-Jul
1978 78 95-332 31-May 1-Jun 9-Jun 19-Jun 23-Jun | 19-Jul 20-Jul 2-Aug 1
1978 78 95-355 13-Jul 13-Jul 20-Jul 1-Aur 7-AuB 17-AuR 17-AuR 25-Aur 8-Sep |
1979 79 96-38 31-May 31-May 6-Jun 18-Jun 26-Jun 17-Jun 20-Jun 25-Jul
1980 80 96-240 1-May 1-May
1980 80 96-249 1 1-Jun 8-May 8-May 6-Jul 23-Jul 15-May 14-May 26-May
1980 80 96-304 11-Jun 1 1-Jun I9-Jun 23-Jun 28-Jun 2-Jul 2-Jul 8-Jul
1980 80 96-352 9-Sep 14-Sep 15-Sep 16-Sep 16-Sep 1 16-Sep 16-Sep 17-Sep
1981 81 97-12 8-May 13-May 13-May 14-May 21-May 4-Jun 4-Jun 5-Jun
1981 81 97-39 12-Mar 4/1SASC 23-Jun 1-Apr 7-Apr 4-Aur 30-Jul 14-Aur
1982 82 97-147 29-Jan 4-Feh 9-Feb 10-Feb 10-Feb 15-Feh
1982 82 97-14X 29-Jan 4-Feb 9-Feb 10-Feb 10-Feb 22-Feb
1982 82 97-216 24-Jun 24-Jun 24-Jun 29-Jun 29-Jun 15-Jul 15-Jul 18-Jul




1983 83 98-08 1-Mar 1-Mar 3-Mar 7-Mar 17-Mar
j
22-Mar 24-Mar 24-Mar
1983 83 98-63 18-May 18-May 25-May 26-May 16-Jun | 28-Jul 29-Jul 30-Jul
1983 84 98-181 22-Sep 22-Sep 5-Ocl 19-Ocl 27-Oct 4-Nov 16-Nnv 17-Nov 30-Nov
1984 84 98-248 28-Feb 29-Feb 6-Mar 8-Mar 15-Mar 27-Mar 27-Mar 27-Mar 30-Mar :
1984 84 98-332 28-Feb 29-Feb 6-Mar 14-Mar 5-Apr 24-Mav 25-Jun 2-Jul
1984 84 98-396 27-Jul 27-Jul 1-Aur 2-Aun S-Aur 10-Aur 10-Aur 22-Aur
1985 85 99-10 21-Feb 21 -Feb 28-Feh 5-Mar 20-Mar 2-Apr 2-Apr 4-Apr
1985 85 99-88 22-May 22-May 12-Jun 20-Jun 13-Jun 31-Jul 31-Jul 1-Aur 15-Auk
1986 86 99-243 6-Feh 6-Feh 6-Feh 10-Feb
1986 86 99-263 26- Feb 26-Feb 26-Feb 5-Mar 13-Mar 18-Mar 19-Mar 24-Mar
1986 86 99-349 25-Mar 25-Mar 25-Mar 15-May 6-Jun 24-Jun 26-Jun 26-Jun 2-Jul
1987 87 100-71 25-Mar 25-Mar 25-Mar 1-May 25-Mar 2-Jun 30-Jun I -Jul 11 -Jul
1988 88 304 26-Apr 26-Apr 27-Apr 28-Apr 29-Apr
1988 88 393 13-Jul 27-Jul 13-Jul 10-Aur 13-Jul U-Aur 11-Aur 14-Aur
1989 89 101-45 18-May 18-May 18-May 24-May 18-May 15-Jun 23-Jun 23-Jun 30-Jun
1990 89 101-302 27-Mar 3-Apr 27-Mar 1-May 24-Apr 24-May 24-May 24-May 25-May
1991 91 102-2291 28-Feb 28-Feh 28-Feb 15-Nov 27-Nov 27-Nov 27-Nov 27-Nov 12-Dec
1991 91 102-27 5-Mar 7-Mar 5-Mar 20-Mar 14-Mar 22-Mar 22-Mar 22-Mar 10-Apr
1991 91 102-28 S-Mar 5-Mar 7-Mar 14-Mar 19-Mar 21-Mar 22-Mar 22-Mar 10-Apr
1992 91 102-302 12-May I4-May 12-May 21-May 19-May 17-Jun 18-Jun 18-Jun 22-Jun
1992 92 102-368 21-Jul 28-Jul 21-Jul 15-Sep 21-Jul 18-Sep 18-Sep 18-Sep 23-Sep
1993 92 103-24 15-Mar 19-Mar 15-Mar 21-Apr 15-Mar 22-Apr 22-Apr 22-Apr 23-Apr
1993 92 103-50 13-May 26-May 13-May 22-Jun 13-May 30-Jun 1-Jul 1-Jul 2-Jul
1993 93 103-75 20-Jul 27-Jul 20-Jul 4-Aur 20-Jul 6-Aue 6-Aur 6-Aur 12-Auk
1994 94 103-211 1-Feh 3-Feb 1-Feb 10-Feb 1-Feb 1 1-Feb 1 1-Feb 1 1-Feb 12-Feh
1995 95 104-06 10-Feb 22-Feb 10-Feb 16-Mar 2-Mar 6-Apr 6-Apr 6-Apr 10-Apr
1996 97 104-208 11-Jun 28-Sep 30-Sep
1997 96 105-18 12-Jun
j 12-Jun 12-Jun 12-Jun 12-Jun 12-Jun
1998 97 105-174 27-Mar 31-Mar' 27-Mar 31-Mar 27-Mar 23-Apr 30-Apr 30-Apr 1-May
1998 98 105-277 24-Jul 30-Jul 24-Jul 30-Jul 24-Jul 19-Oct 20-Ocl 21-Ocl 21-Oct
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